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This lecture is an attempt to carry on an exercise in which 
certain fairly recent German philosophers have believed 
strongly, in which some Anglo-Saxon philosophers have made 
half-hearted essays in the fairly recent past, though hardly any 
Anglo-Saxon philosopher now has anything to do with it, or 
would even seriously consider it, but in which I, who like iso-
lated situations, believe profoundly, and on which I shall con-
tinue to write and lecture, though I am increasingly aware of 
the subtle intricacy and elusiveness of the ideas and argumenta-
tions that it involves. This venture is what Husserl called the 
constitution of a value-cosmos-a venture he mentioned but did 
not himself enter upon-the setting up of an ordered system of 
things ultimately desirable and undesirable, but in some such 
way that the whole constitution represents a work of reason, 
that it has something mandatory, non-arbitrary and, dare we 
say it, absolute about it, much as there are similar absolute 
constitutions in such fields as tense-theory, knowledge and 
belief-theory, the theory of syntax and meaning and so on. The 
setting up of such a value-cosmos proceeds on the basic assump-
tion that in every sphere the arbitrary, the empirical, the con-
tingent, necessarily nests in a comprehensive framework of 
what is absolute, of what must obtain, of what cannot be other-
wise, of what holds whatever is the case or whatever we like to 
choose. The absolute in this sense involves the contingent and 
the arbitrary, and is precisely what will hold invariantly what-
ever the variable content of the contingent and the arbitrary 
may be: it requires the contingent and arbitrary, just as the 
latter in its turn requires it. For, on the view we are espousing, 
one can only raise questions or make decisions of a Yes-or-No 
type on a background of acceptances from which an alternative 
'No' is excluded. We can only learn from experience in any 
field, provided we already non-empirically know, with some 
measure of clearness, the constitution of that field, what sort of 
entities and arrangements it permits or does not permit, and 
empirical encounter can only fill in the blanks of the constitu-
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tional pattern thus laid before us. In the same way, we can only 
plan our lives, and counsel others to plan their lives, within the 
fixed constitutional pattern of a set of ends and counter-ends 
that we cannot evade, that are pre-accepted in every acceptance 
or rejection. This notion of an a priori background to every· 
thing that is subsequently discovered or chosen must not, how-
ever, be given a merely definitional meaning, that in effect 
turns it into something arbitrary and contingent: it must have 
a regional, contentful meaning, specified by the kind of territory 
or enquiry or enterprise we are undertaking or ranging over. 
And while there are ultimately no conceivable alternatives to 
the framework, the constitution that we, or rather it, is setting 
up, this is only so because at a more abstract level such alterna-
tives are quite conceivable: specific necessities nest in others 
that are more generic, and from the standpoint of the latter the 
former are in a sense synthetic, mere matters of fact. It is in 
fact only by the deep attempt to conceive of them, to envisage 
certain alternatives clearly, as the mandates of a wider, more 
formal necessity seem to permit, that we become aware of their 
engaged, contentful incoherence, an incoherence in terms of 
which the a priori mles of our region or territory first define 
themselves. 
To talk in general terms of a value-cosmos or an emotional-
practical a priori is, however, extremely unsatisfactory unless 
you have some notion of the sort of scheme that this might en-
tail. And I shall therefore briefly unroll before you the value-
cosmos sketched by Nicolai Hartmann in his forty-year old 
Ethics, a work which derived much of its inspiration from the 
earlier work of Max Scheler. My excuse for citing a work so 
old is that Hartmann's work is by no means as widely known 
and used as it ought to be. It has many faults of incoherence, 
unclearness, dogmatism and stylistic ebullience to explain its 
comparative neglect, but it does in some respects daringly show 
us what an accomplished value-cosmos would be like, and it is 
for this reason that I now make exemplary use of it. Also being 
the one systematic value-cosmology available in English, apart 
from my own poor efforts in Values and Intentions, I think it 
entirely justifiable to make use of it on the present occasion. 
Hanmann in his Ethics espouses the doctrine of a logic of the 
heart, a logique du coeur, a notion which had been previously 
put forward by Scheler and connected with certain passages in 
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Pascal. The heart, apparently, is an organ that can range sensi-
tively over the whole sphere of time and existence, of the pos-
sible and the impossible, and in all its rangings it can throb 
responsively in the presence of certain mysterious values and 
disvalues, quite different from the non-valuational 'materials' 
in which they arc embedded, or the concrete 'bearers' which 
exemplify them, and belonging in fact to a different order alto· 
gether, a timeless, Platonic order of self-existent axiological 
entities. The heart in its ranging does not, according to Hart-
mann, often err or miss a beat, but it is curiously narrow in its 
sensitiveness, so that the opening up of each new territory of 
value tends to inhibit its responsiveness to others. Hence we 
have the constant shift of the valuational focus, and the revolu-
tionary changes from Graeco-Roman to Christian axiology, from 
Christian axiology to Renaissance axiology, ending up with the 
transvalued Nietzschean values, to which Hartmann, in com-
pany with many others, attributes an importance and a char-
acteristic modernity that I find totally incomprehensible. 
Hartmann, however, does not think that any real transvalua-
tions occur in these shifts: the heart merely opens itself to new 
ranges of value, and ceases to be sensitive to older ones. The 
old and the new are, however, alike there in their timeless 
Platonic home, and it is the special role of the philosophical 
heart, trained to beat more widely and strongly by a special 
course of Hartmannian approfondissement, that can set the old 
alongside the new, and can effect a confrontation of pagan 
Greece with mediaeval Christianity, and of both with Nietz-
chean modernity. 
Hartmann has many further original doctrines regarding 
the world of values and disvalues which the heart explores and 
maps: all such values have attaching to them an ideal ought-to-
beness or Seinsollen, which becomes a positive ought-to-beness 
when the values in question are unrealized in the world of par-
ticular existence, an ought-to-beness which is experienced as a 
positive tension, an urge, to realize the value in the world of 
existence and becoming. Apparently men and their hearts and 
muscles are the one channel through which the world of values 
and disvalues inftuences the world of existence: Hartmann re-
jects any teleology of the 'good' operating over the unconscious 
field of nature, and speaks therefore of the 'demiurgic nature of 
man' as the one link between the 'irreal' world of values and 
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the realm of reality. Hartmann has further logical excitements 
connected with his doctrine of ought-to-beness, excitements 
that will not recommend him to modal logicians. In an ought, 
he maintains, we have a case of a must, a necessity which, by a 
logical miracle, has broken loose from its close connection with 
the actual and the possible, so that what ought to be, must be 
so, even if it is not so, and even if it is impossible that it should 
be so. It is here that we get Hartmann's extremely illuminating 
and acceptable doctrine of the antinomic character of the realm 
of value: there are values lying in opposed directions, e.g., those 
of innocence and sophistication, which are such that they can-
not be combined, and yet it remains a mandatory requirement 
that they should be combined, that we should by some means 
become innocent sophisticates or sophisticated innocents. We 
are in fact involved in guilt whichever of the horns of the 
dilemma before us we may embrace. I find this doctrine ex-
tremely interesting, true to our value-experience and not at all 
logically incoherent. Our value-experience is that all choice 
and existence involves a sacrifice of some value or other, and 
yet that such a sacrifice is authentically regrettable, that it 
should not be. There is nothing self-contradictory in the eternal 
requirement of something whose full realization would involve 
self-contradiction, and contradictions therefore have a mean-
ingful role in evaluative and also in religious discourse that 
they do not have in the discourse of science. The inimitable 
perfection of God, the absolute Good, lies arguably in the fact 
that He represents an ideal, a value-limit, that nothing crea-
turely, nothing instantial could possibly embody. 
If we now turn from these general features of structure to 
the actual content of the heart's responses, Hartmann has much 
that is interesting to tell us. He believes in an axiological space 
in which there are several dimensions, so that not every value is 
comparable with every other in respect of height or preferabil-
ity: aesthetic values, e.g., are neither higher nor lower than 
those of science or morality. He believes also in unfilled gaps 
or distances in the value-continuum as remarkable and sur-
prising as the gaps between the prime numbers. And he believes 
that certain values are built upon others as their presupposi-
tions. Thus he propounds as a theorem the sensible doctrine 
that moral values always presuppose other lower classes of value, 
and that it is only by trying to realize something that is not a 
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case of moral good, such as freedom from pain or from baseless 
inequality or insecurity, that one can be morally good. His 
most interesting articulations arc, first, into a lowest order of 
what may be called logical or categorial values which are all 
antinomic: they occur in opposed pairs, and it is never possible 
fully to realize both members of each such pair, though com-
promises and adjustments among them are possible. There is 
a value of fixed necessity and a value of variable contingency, 
a value in the realization of values and a value in their perma-
nent non-realization, a value in universal uniformity and a 
value in divergent individuality, a value in simplicity and a 
value in complexity, and so on. All this may seem banal, but 
its banality is not due to recognition by philosophers. From 
these categorial values Hartmann advances to values which 
represent as it were the foothills of moral value: the value of 
being alive, of being conscious, or being purposively active and 
efficient, of being able lO withstand and suffer, of foresight, of 
having the opportunities for moral development represented by 
the situation, by language, by social intercourse, as well as by 
such Aristotelian goods as wealth, power, reputation etc. Hart-
mann then proceeds to examine moral values, the values of the 
dedicated will, and here he sets the noble, the pure and the rich 
alongside of the merely good, and then takes us through a splen-
did gallery of the aretaics of Classical Greece, of Catholic Chris-
tianity and finally of modern Nietzschcanism. Throughout this 
wonderful and ingenious phenomenology one is amazed at the 
wealth and variety of valuational stances and questions, es-
pecially when one considers the hopeless poverty and emptiness 
of our recent ethi<:s and meta-ethics: to go to Hartmann from 
the latter is like penetrating to the treasure-laden tomb of 
Tutankhamen after living in the impoverished huts of Egyptian 
fellahin. One is also amazed at the general persuasiveness, or at 
least the deep discussability, of all the points put forth by Hart-
mann. It may not be easy to sec how the heart-logic is operating, 
but that it does and can operate, and with its own genuine m-
lionale, is what no one can think doubtful. 
One feels, however, some reservations about admitting 
purely descriptive, imuitivc work like Hartmann's Ethics into 
the highest reaches of philosophy. It too often merely tells us 
that something is so, it too seldom tries to show us why it is so. 
It does not, in other words, systematically consider the alterna-
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tives to each assertion that it makes, nor seek to exclude them 
on any definite principle. I shall not attempt to enumerate all 
the philosophical questions raised by a successful venture of 
the Hartmannian type, and particularly not those connected 
with the cognitive role assigned to feelings, nor those connected 
with the Platonic self-existence so lightly asserted, nor those 
connected with the unique demiurgic function ascribed to man, 
nor those connected with the strange transformation undergone 
by necessity in order to emerge as that new logical creature, the 
ought-to-be. But what I shall ask is how Hartmann can legiti-
mate all the poignant and fascinating things he says about anti-
nomies of value, hierarchies of value, many dimensions and 
orders of value and so on. We are often disposed to assent to 
what he says, but we as often wonder why we are so. And how 
do we counter the determined relativist, the true Nietzschean 
who is now becoming so abundant, or, worse still, the proponent 
and advocate of values of the abyss, of the utterly abominable 
and repugnant: the values attributed to meaningless arbitrari-
ness occurring on a sorrowful background of equal meaning-
lessness, the values of surrender to a dark divinity who first 
demands the sacrifice of one's reason and one's morals, the value 
of gratuitous disturbance of social patterns which tends only to 
further disturbance, the value attached to cruelty and absurdity 
loved and cherished for their own sakes? Our age has exceeded 
all previous ages in the richness of its perversions, and without 
some principle that can sort out the valid from the deviant 
forms, it will not be possible to carry our value-constitution very 
far. We have therefore no alternative but to embark on some-
thing like a transcendental deduction of the realm of truly 
acceptable values, a deduction which will suffice to distinguish 
them from their many verminous and scrofulous imitators; 
this deduction will not be less valuable because both its first 
principles and its mode of developing them, or reasoning from 
them, has an element of the lax and the loose, and is not strictly 
and trivially deductive: the various 'deductions' which Kant 
offers us in his various Critiques are valuable and informative 
precisely on account of this element of the lax and the loose. I 
am now about to give you a savour of my own contribution to 
value-theory in Values and Intentions, an undertaking which 
my friend Karl Popper rightly described as an attempt to carry 
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out a transcendental deduction, contentful and material and not 
merely formal, of the heads of value and disvalue. 
I shall endeavour to construct the whole map of value and 
disvalue if you will grant me the r.oii uTw of a single assumption: 
that we are in the grip, and necessarily in the grip, of an aspira-
tion towards what I shall call 'impersonality,' and this I shall 
further describe as the aspiration, framed by a particular person 
having quite specific interests, to rise above the specificity of 
his interests and the particularity of his person, and to desire 
that, and only that, that he could and would consistently desire, 
whoever he conceived himself as being, and whatever he con-
ceived himself as desiring as a concrete, first-order object of 
interest. Men, I am suggesting, may harbour a curious alge-
braic passion to substitute for everything that is definite and 
constant in the objects or subjects of their practical wishes, vari-
ables most utterly unrestricted, and then to be practically 
guided by whatever survives the removal of everything concrete 
and contentful and empirically definite in their practical en-
deavours. And I am further suggesting that if indeed men are 
subject to this algebraic passion, which is perhaps what is 
meant in calling them rational animals, then its long-term 
operation will not be simply an empty formalism or a killing 
annihilation of their primary interests in favour of nothing in 
particular, but the generation of a whole system of heads of 
worthwhileness and counterworthwhileness which will have a 
necessary and authoritative and intrinsically justifiable posi-
tion which no other substantially different aspiration or set of 
aspirations could conceivably generate. I am in short claiming 
not only that my aspiration will prove to have content, and not 
merely empty form, but that this content will be such as to gen-
erate a firm 'ought' from an 'is,' and an 'ought' that not 
merely expresses a demand prescribed to someone by someone, 
but a demand prescribed by everyone to everyone, and that not 
merely in some matter-of-fact fashion but in a manner which 
combines necessity with normativity. The aspiration in ques-
tion, I am attempting to argue, is really the dominant universal 
present in all the cases of value and disvalue that we can with 
some approvable colour regard as compelling, non-arbitrary, 
intersubjective or what not, and that it in fact defines what it is 
to be the sort of value or disvalue in question. There is, from 
the standpoint of the aspiration in question, no mystery in the 
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compelling, non-arbitrary character of certain values and dis-
values: they are the values and disvalues so framed and consti-
tuted as to have non-arbitrariness, intersubjectivity written 
into their constitution, they are in fact no more than specific 
embodiments or applications of non-arbitrariness. It would be 
as absurd to regard them as merely arbitrary and personal as it 
would be to regard the values and disvalues which express or-
dinary personal choice and preference as mandatory and uni-
versal. That we arc 'in the gTip' of such as aspiration means 
further that its operation is not merely personal and variable 
and contingent, but that it is an aspiration that all men, in so 
far as they are men, inevitably must form, and which has in 
itself, further, the promise and the possibility of a growing 
strength, so that, whatever other tendencies may grow at its 
side, and be in no way derivative from or subject to it, they may 
none the less fulfil the role of the variable material, suitable 
or unsuitable, which exists in its framework or upon its back-
ground. For an aspiration which projected an impeccable set 
of values, and yet was itself a mere chance side-issue in human 
nature, would not quite do the logical work required in the 
constitution of a realm of values and disvalues. That anything 
will do all the logical work required seems, however, extra-
ordinarily dubious and requires a great deal of argument. 
Before I go on to such argument I shall, however, try to elu-
cidate various points in the formulation that I have just put 
forward. I wish to advert, first of all, to the use of the words 
'could' and 'would' in my formulation above: to aspire to be 
impersonal is to aspire to desire that, and only that, that a man 
could and would desire, whoever he conceived himself as being, 
etc. The 'would' of this formula is not an expression of logical 
necessity, for obviously there is nothing that everyone, what-
ever his primary interests, would desire in this sense: many 
persons desire only idiosyncratic personal objects varying from 
case to case. Nor is it a 'would' expressive of natural law, for, 
apart from the objection that there are no objects of desire de-
manded by the laws of nature, it would in this case have no 
absolute force at all, nothing that would generate a system of 
values holding for all practical beings. On the other hand if one 
defines the aspiration as the aspiration to pursue only what a 
man could desire, whoever he conceived himself as being, one 
is brought to a halt by the obscurity of the word 'could.' It must 
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not be interpreted in an abstract formal sense, for obviously 
anything whatever, even stamp-collecting, could be pursued by 
everyone, and it is not clear that the laws of human nature or 
the structure of human society would rule out such a strange 
addiction. One's hesitation between 'would' and 'could' shows 
one, however, what one is looking for. It is the 'would' which 
one uses when one says that everyone who likes Michaelangelo 
would like Tintoretto too, and that one is always willing to ex-
change for a 'could very well' or 'could as well' in such a context. 
One is not dealing with the analytic 'would' or 'must' of formal 
logic, nor with the empty 'could' of formal non-contradiction, 
but with what we may call a near-necessity of essence, some· 
thing that is very likely to be the case, but on a priori rather 
than empirical grounds. It is as I say the sort of near-necessity 
that he who wills the end must or could very well will the means, 
or that he who likes this A could very well like something 
rather like this A. The realm of mind is honeycombed with 
these near-necessities in terms of which understanding of people 
and their attitudes is alone possible. And we may note that, al· 
most invariably, this 'would' or 'could' of near-necessity passes 
over or paraphrases itself into an 'ought' or a 'should.' The 
near-necessity of essence is an unfulfilled 'ought' for the man 
who fails to carry it out to its natural limit. 
Another point that it is important to stress is that my ac· 
count of impersonality is not one that makes it inimical to 
primary interest, in the sense of the interest in empirical objects 
of various sorts, the interest which is essentially such that there 
is no intrinsic reason why more than one person should share it. 
The impersonal may be such as to espouse invariant rather 
than contingently variable objects of interest, but its invariants 
always permit and in fact require contingently variable interests, 
which it is in fact their function to organize, and in contrast 
with which they alone can be impersonal and can exercise their 
function of impersonality. This requirement of first-order 
interests is in fact part and parcel of the appeal to whoever and 
whatever that occurred in our formulation, for no one would 
find an intrinsic appeal in emptily universal ends that bore no 
relation to what he concretely wanted or that even ran athwart 
his primary interests. The desire to be moved only by what one 
might desire whoever one conceived of oneself as being, is not 
a desire to be free from primary interest, but to pursue its goals 
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only as falling under, or at least not conflicting with, what one 
desires impersonally, and even this relative freedom is desired 
only in so far as one aspires to be impersonal, which does not 
preclude, and in fact requires, a rich growth of primary im-
pulses, in the other segments of one's being. We may note here 
that even the desire to be free from all primary interests which 
has been so powerfully recommended by certain renunciatory 
philosophies and religions really presupposes primary interests: 
it bases itself on our first-order aversions from various concrete 
frustrations, and is itself nothing but a generalized aversion 
from frustration as such, which, rightly or wrongly, it believes 
to be the sole fruit of human endeavour. 
It may be noted further that I have brought the word 'con-
sistently' into my formulation, and that I have spoken of 'who-
ever he may conceive himself as being' rather than of 'whoever 
he may happen to be.' The point I am trying to make is that 
the impersonal goals are not the invariant ends that everyone 
would or could pursue, and that one consequently would or 
could pursue whoever one was, but that they are the ends which 
require that one should conceptually place oneself in every 
possible person's shoes, and should then frame ends that take 
account of and also rise above all that one might pursue in all 
these conceived situatim1s seen together, and which would there-
fore have a certain ideal collectivity of attitude as well as the 
distributiveness which alone will not do the impersonal trick. 
The man who aspires to conduct himself impersonally, must 
not merely pursue ends that he might well desire whoever he 
was, for in this case victory over all others might be a very good 
candidate for impersonal honours: he must rather pursue such 
ends as he might pursue if he were everyone at once, or everyone 
at the same time, absurd as this may seem, if he entered into 
everyone else's predicament as intimately as his own. What we 
are saying is of course ordinarily phrased in the form that a man 
must be ready to pursue for others whatever he is ready to pur-
sue for himself, but this brings into the arena a bedevilling 
surd which is only surmounted when the man abolishes the 
otherness of the other by treating the other as someone whom 
in some extraordinary sense he might be or might have been, or 
in other words by 'putting himself into his place.' What the in-
dividual wants impersonally therefore stands or falls with the 
strange procedure of disembarrassing oneself of one's own indi-
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viduality, and deciding what one would desire not only whoever 
one was but even if one was everyone. What one here does may 
be meaningless or impossible from the standpoint of many 
philosophical theories of identity, but it is certainly involved 
in the commonplace talk of looking at things from everyone's 
point of view. And in terms of this strange procedure we can 
understand the harmless growth of an apparently formidable 
infinite series: that what a man desires impersonally he not only 
would desire whoever he conceived himself as being, but that 
he would also desire it for everyone else as much as for himself, 
and that he would desire everyone else to desire it for everyone 
else, and everyone else to desire everyone else to desire it for 
everyone else, and so on indefinitely. The strange gambit of 
putting oneself into everyone else's shoes involves, it seems, that 
qua everyone one again puts oneself into the sum total of avail-
able shoes, and that qua everyone one goes on repeating the 
same process indefinitely. Each added term of the series seems 
to complicate the old, but in reality only makes explicit what is 
already there. Only such ends as can consistently survive this 
whole process of shoe-exchanging can be the impersonal ends 
we are trying to sketch. It seems ambitious to hope that some-
thing clear and positive can emerge out of processes so murky. 
What I must now attempt to do is to work out the main 
heads of a generally accepted value-cosmos from the aspiration 
that I have taken such trouble to state unclearly. Plainly, as 
has been assumed, none of the more concrete goals of human 
striving or liking, and none of the more specific doings or un-
dergoings in which men take delight or from which they experi-
ence aversion, can be given any absolute value-status, no matter 
how important they may be to individuals. Tea-drinking, 
mountain-climbing, the reading of one's favourite philosopher, 
all fall under the ban which excludes from absolute value what 
some only may find interesting while others have to it a contrary 
attitude, or no attitude at all. They may of course reenter the 
sphere of the absolutely valuable under another more general 
description, as special cases in certain circumstances of charac-
ters having a justifiable, mandatory appeal, but as what they are 
described they have no such privileges. Even the objects of 
universal human instincts occupy the same position: the objects 
and acts of sex, for instance, are objects in which we as a race 
for the most part happen to be interested, and interested in a 
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primary fashion. They are not objects in which anyone would 
or could be interested no matter what his primary interests. 
There is an hrox~ a general suspension of acceptance of all such 
objects of contingent, primary interest: only under such head-
ings as survive the i11'ox7/ can they make their reentry into the 
field of absolute values. Are there such headings? And if so, 
what are they? Or have we, in the interests of an empty formal-
ism expelled all positive content from the realm of value? 
It is readily arguable that this is not the case at all. By a 
strange step into the second order, one can take satisfaction in 
the conformity of things to one's wants, one can, in other words, 
be satisfied with and want satisfiaction or pleasure, as an object 
which everyone with some non-contingent naturalness must 
come to desire, whatever the actual content of his interests, and 
which we, who put ourselves into the shoes of all such interested 
parties, and who espouse only such ends as may be pursued by 
all and for all, also find interesting and satisfactory. To have 
what one wants, which is the basic presupposition of all pleasure 
and satisfaction, is no contingent object of desire or satisfaction 
like the tea-drinking or the mountain-climbing mentioned 
above; it is as it were what everyone must want as soon as he 
reflects calmly on the matter, and which, since he will want it 
into whoever's shoes he projects himself, he will likewise want 
for all and find satisfactory for all and will want all to want and 
find satisfactory for all, and so on indefinitely. If one wants to 
drink tea or climb mountains or to do other things, and does 
not want to be satisfied by these activities or to have any satisfac-
tion whatsoever, plainly some special explanation is required 
for one's perverse and abnormal state. A man who has primary 
wants, but desires them all to be frustrated, is no logically im-
possible creature; such ascetic personalities have existed and 
always will exist. But the way their interests have developed 
is rightly considered twisted, difficult, improbable, illogical, 
something not natural in an a priori and not merely empirically 
inductive sense. "We must at the same time avoid suggesting 
that there is something merely tautological, unprogressive in 
passing from an interest in primary empirical goals, to an in-
terest in the satisfaction which such goals afford. It is, as Butler 
and others have stressed, the most immense of steps, and the one 
that makes man a rational agent, able to integrate and coordi-
nate the most diverse concrete interests under the compre-
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hensive rubrics of the satisfactory, the pleasant and the avoid-
ance of their opposites. Beside this immense step the further 
step to being interested in the satisfactions that one might have 
in other people's shoes is entirely minor and inconsiderable. 
Egoism and altruism alike soar infinitely above the animal, and 
altruism is only intelligible as a transcendental, notional ego-
ism that has shed the bonds of particularity. Problems of the 
adjustment of my own various and other people's interests will 
of course arise in the most numerous and vexatious forms, but 
they will not be intrinsically necessary as it would be if every-
one sought to impose his particular goals and tastes upon all 
others. Satisfaction at least provides a currency, or set of cur-
rencies, vague no doubt in their precise exchange value, in 
which intra- and interpersonal practice may be adjusted. A 
similar intrinsic naturalness attends the interest in the process 
or activity of successfully progressing towards what one wants, 
and which is really one's goal in prospect, and not strictly sep-
arable from that goal. There would be something perverse, or 
very specially motivated, or supersubtle in saying that one did 
not care for success, or for the smoothly nearing prospect of the 
things one cherished and was bringing about. The will to power 
and the will to freedom are similarly directions of willing that 
are not on a par with ordinary contingent trends of personal 
desire: whatever one personally desires, one must tend to desire 
the power to achieve what one desires and the freedom from all 
that could hinder one in ito; realization. One must not, of 
course, ignore in one's survey the nigh-necessary second order 
aversion from frustration and pain: whatever anyone desires, 
one must impersonally desire anyone to be freed from these. 
I here leave aside the problem as to whether the pains of getting 
what one wants and the frustrations of not getting it are 
ever worth the countervailing satisfactions and pleasures: I 
make no pronouncement on what Buddhism calls its First Noble 
Truth. But even if it were a Noble Truth, it would be no more 
than an assessment of the overall values and disvalues of human 
existence: it would not make a difference to those values and 
disvalues themselves. 
From the impersonal desire for satisfaction and freedom 
from frustration for everyone, one necessarily and naturally 
goes on, in avoiding internal discrepancy, to those ideals of jus-
tice and fairness, which involve no more than a viable accom-
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modation of satisfactions and freedom from frustration for 
everyone, an accommodation which necessarily involves many 
arbitrary, conventional and institutional features. I shall not 
develop the a priori case for justice, nor dwell on the arbitrary 
element in its precise application. The demand for justice does 
not, however, become less of an absolute demand because the 
precise manner of its implementation is anything but absolute: 
for particular would-be just dispensations we may not care, but 
there is a plain absurdity in saying that one has no taste for 
justice as such. In so far as one considers and considers together, 
what one would feel whoever one was, one quite necessarily 
cares for it: it is precisely what shoe-changing both lives on and 
fosters. Last item of all in the present enumeration, an imper-
sonal interest in the just accommodation of interest logically 
leads to an impersonal interest in the action and will of all 
persons concerned to implement such an accommodation, an 
action and will only abstractly separable from the accommoda-
tions that they effect. We have the interest in justice as a virtue, 
a virtue which, taken in a wide sense, as Aristotle says, compre-
hends all the moral virtues. You will pardon me if, in a con-
densed exposition, I go no further in the analysis of virtue or 
moral good. The whole system of varied objectives we have 
mentioned are all 'deducible,' in a more or less cogent, if not 
formally necessary manner, from the aspiration towards im-
personality understood as I have understood it. 
We may, in parenthesis, briefly indicate the possibility of 
dealing with such values as those of dedicated love, the pursuit 
of truth, and the pursuit of the well-formed and successfully 
expressive which we also call the beautiful. In all these cases 
we have an analogue of the impersonality which rises above the 
specificity and particularity of personal interest, though here 
there is a rising above a specificity and a particularity which is 
not concerned with persons or their interests. In dedicated love 
there is a rising above any particularity and specificity which 
does not tend to the preservation and defence of what we dedi-
catedly love, and which, in its limited fashion, but with intensi-
fied strength imitates absolute impersonality. In the love of 
truth we have impersonality directed to what is the case or to 
what may be the case, or to whatever is evidence for what 
may be the case, no matter what the content or source of 
one's evidence or information. In the interest in the beau-
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tiful one has an interest in doing justice to an object, in 
bringing out its character or its internal structure in the most 
poignant and vivid manner, no matter what the object may 
be and no matter what other interest it may arouse in any-
one. The analogies between justice, equiprobability and aes-
thetic balance are not hard to point out, and love, truth and 
beauty certainly demand of us a detachment from primary 
interest which is fundamentally similar to the detachment which 
occurs in the pursuit of welfare, of justice and of moral good. 
Being fundamentally similar, this detachment receives and 
deserves the impersonal love which we all give it and desire all 
to share with us in giving it. Aesthetic, scientific and love-
experience therefore enter the sphere of the absolutely valuable 
since they spring from a spirit akin to the spirit which projects 
and constitutes the whole sphere of the absolutely valuable. 
You will perhaps allow me the point without further argu-
ment, that there would be something absurd in using Stevenson-
ian persuasion in the three cases in question. To say: 'I like 
love, truth, beauty: pray do so too': surely this represents the 
apogee of the grotesque and inappropriate. 
We have therefore established, as well as we can hope to 
establish anything on an occasion like the present, that an as-
piration towards impersonality is in a position to generate a 
whole order of impersonal goals, of heads of value and disvalue. 
If we seek only to desire what could be desired whoever we 
might conceive of ourselves as being, and we seek to do this 
with comprehensiveness, consistency and indifference to con-
tent, then we shall find ourselves forced to set up all the higher 
order goals of happiness, freedom from frustration, power, 
liberty, success, justice, moral zeal, dedicated love, scientific and 
aesthetic detachment, which are admittedly the worthwhile 
things in life, as their defects and contraries are admittedly its 
real blemishes. We have now, however, to ask whether there is 
anything like a necessary drift in the direction of impersonality, 
so that the realm of values may have power as well as dignity, 
and may with some colour be regarded as the irremoveable 
background and necessary framework of practical life. It will 
be noted that I do regard it as an important matter whether 
the values I have set up do or do not guide the world, or at least 
help to guide human endeavour: values whose non-natural sta-
tus is consistent with their guiding or influencing no one or 
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nothing are to me totally unmeaning. There can be no mean· 
ingful ought which is not also to some extent an is, and which 
does not at least to some extent tend to be realized. Oughts and 
values express a criticism of what is, on a basis of what it is and 
what it tends to be, and a putative ought which bears no rela-
tion to the actual strivings and tendencies of a thing or a person 
is as unmeaning as it is, in the literal sense, impertinent. 
Shall we say however that the strange passion for divesting 
ourselves of specificity and particularity and putting ourselves 
not only into every actual but also every possible pair of shoes 
represents an inevitable, natural and centrally powerful aspect 
of human nature? Must conscious, reflective beings tend more 
and more to do just this, and must they thus become more and 
more subject to the overarching influence of a firmament of 
impersonal values and disvalues? The answer to this query is, 
I think, curious and paradoxical: that the aspiration towards 
impersonality and the value-firmament that it generates have 
an empirical strength much greater than anything that we could 
have reason to expect on a not too penetrating, if a priori exam-
ination of human existence. lt can certainly be argued, as I 
have argued in detail in my Values and Intentions, that the as-
piration towards impersonality has deep roots in conscious 
experience as such, which can be said to be always in quest of 
an ever widening universality, whether in theory or practice, 
and which can likewise be said to be always in quest, whether 
in theory or practice, of an objectivity which sets a bound to 
personal variability, and to an intersubjectivity which makes 
communication and social cooperation possible. The things 
which generate the firmament of impersonal values are no acci-
dents of human existence: they are inherent in the existence of 
objectively directed states of mind as such and in the existence 
of anything that can be regarded as an explorable, discussable 
real world. The search for the comprehensively universal, for 
the compulsively objective, for the communicably intersub-
jective: these are the basic nisus o£ our conscious subjectivity, 
and of the world that constitutes itself for our thought. 1 am 
not here putting forward an idealistic theory of the world, but 
only of the world as responded to and given to us. \'\That we do 
not, however, have in all this a priori rootedness, is a firm guar-
antee that impersonality will be pressed very far, that it will not 
merely result in sympathies confined to a limited group, and in 
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standards of worthwhileness and counterworthwhileness meant 
to hold only for this group. And this is what we do for the most 
part actually find in practice: that interests extending to anyone 
and everyone whatever they may desire are in general of little 
influence, and that there are even defences erected against them 
in the form of charges of emptiness, sentimentalism, exaggera-
tion and disloyalty whenever they begin to show themselves in 
some strength. The whole process of divesting oneself of one's 
individuality and group-membership and becoming an alge-
braic entity concerned only with a total algebraization of inter-
est is, moreover, so metaphysically mysterious as to arouse 
derision in philosophers as well as in ordinary persons, so that 
like Spinoza we begin to think it absurd to be concerned for the 
well-being of flies and other humble creatures. It would seem 
that all that we c:an predict with reliability are those tribally or 
racially limited values and disvalues whose great uniformity 
has astonished certain sociologists. What we do find, however, 
is the presence of a strange responsiveness in the most diverse 
classes of men to the total algebraizations I have mentioned and 
that even in the case of the childlike and unreflective. The 
monstrous inequity of treating even animals sometimes as 
they are treated in many slaughter-houses and in factory-farms 
is readily clear to many children, no matter how soon they may 
learn to dismiss it as weak sentimentality, and the moral devo-
tion which re£uses to see unpersons in blacks, lepers and other 
classes of the underprivileged and the unfortunate, and pursues 
them with burning, practical love, is another example of the 
same unexpected, astonishing responsiveness. Men certainly be-
have, with much greater frequency than is rationally predict-
able, as if there were something in them intrinsically and pas-
sionately transcendent of specificity and particularity, no matter 
how deeply and necessarily they may be immersed in either. 
I may conclude this lecture by suggesting that the strange 
hauntingness of the impersonal value-firmament that I have 
sketched, and of the aspiration towards impersonality which 
projects it, points to an old shadow which meets us along many 
avenues of discourse and argument, no matter how little it may 
seem meaningful to modern thought. I refer to the notion of 
an ontological Absolute, the notion of something having that 
indiscerptible unity, that necessity of existence and necessary 
possession of essential properties, which goes together with and 
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totally explains the existence of all that exists finitely, contin-
gently, empirically and separately, which is one among others, 
which might not have been there, which seems to stand loose and 
separate and apart. Absolute-theory or the theory of what 
uniquely, necessarily and unitively is, and what is in some sense 
logically responsible for whatever contingently exists or is the 
case, is, I believe, an indispensable philosophical enquiry, and 
one that puts the logical keystone on to every other philosoph-
ical enquiry, and not least on to enquiries into the impersonal 
values and disvalues that we have been exploring. For an Ab-
solute has precisely that transcendence of separate individuality 
and one-sided empirical content, while at the same time cover-
ing and organizing all such individuality and such content, 
which we have found to be essential to the realm of values. An 
Absolute is a very strange logical object, investigated if at all 
only by purely logical methods. For being the sort of thing that 
must exist necessarily if it exists at all, it is necessarily non-exist-
ent if there is even a doubt as to its possible non-existence, while 
on the other hand it can only be in any way thinkable and pos-
sible if it also exists certainly and of necessity. This means that 
purely logical insight is the one tool through which Absolutes 
can be investigated, anything empirical, anything that we may 
or may not encounter, being rigorously excluded. It is only 
our deepening insight, our progressive exclusion of what seemed 
to be but are not genuinely alternatives, that can leave us at the 
last, if we are left, with a truly viable, explanatory Absolute. If 
some think that this means that such an Absolute can be no 
more than an empty thing of thought, nothing can be wider of 
the mark. Absolutes by their indiscerptible unity and all 
pervasive responsibility are precisely the guarantors of those 
unitive, rational enterprises, whether in theory or practice, 
which, on assumptions of boundless logical pluralism and inde-
pendence, are incapable even of an approach to justification. 
Absolutes and Absolute-theory are in fact justified by the jus-
tifying work that they do, and that radically empiricist and 
pluralist philosophies cannot possibly do. The logical im-
possibility and self-destroying meaninglessness of the latter are 
the only true proofs of an Absolute. And the difficult consti-
tution of the realm of values and disvalues is of course above 
all a rational enterprise that requires such explanation and 
justification through an Absolute. 
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Absolutes can be, and have been, however, very variously 
conceived. For though there can be no alternatives to a true 
Absolute, there are always alternative Absolutes for us, and will 
be as long as we have a defective insight into the necessary and 
the possible and the existential and many other such categorial 
matters. For it is a wrong belief, and we must utterly reject it, 
that what is really possible or impossible or necessary or real can 
be settled by a mere linguistic convention, and not by an exami-
nation of the sorts of thing one has on hand, and of what being 
such sorts of things carries with it or does not carry with it. 
Absolutes have been conceived as self-diversifying media spread 
out in time and space, as transcendent godheads exercising un-
limited optional creativity or non-creativity, as a mind or spirit 
scattered over a whole society of communicating intelligences, 
as an ideal Platonic world of forms deploying itself in a half-
real world of instances, and so on. Part of the task of Absolute-
theory is a discussion of all these alternatives, and of the degree 
to which they leave anything merely external or unmapped-
up or unexplained. It is here that I shall simply affirm my 
belief in the superior merit of Hegelian-type Absolutes, Abso-
lutes which can only be unitary in so far as they go as far as pos-
sible in the direction of diremption and multiplicity and 
apparent mutual independence, and which reveal their deep 
unity, and are in fact one, only in the continuous act of break-
ing down and overcoming the diremption that they have at first 
seemingly introduced. The natural world in space and time 
represents such an Absolute in its nearest approach to utter 
dispersion and mutual externality, that essentially impossible 
condition which abstract formal logic often treats as the very 
paradigm of the possible. This dispersed natural world gives 
rise to the vastly closer unity of life and mind in order to dem-
onstrate, as it were, the impossibility of such a merely dispersed, 
natural being. In life, and more so in mind, mutual interpene-
tration and dependence take over from dispersion and seeming 
independence, but there is still a higher independence seem-
ingly maintained in the atomistic separateness of the conscious 
person, whose pathetic, logical incapacity for true sharing has 
been the theme of much of the modern thought of \Vittgenstein 
and others. The various stars in the firmament of value repre-
sent, however, the Absolute asserting its unity over the seeming 
dispersion of persons: the Absolute shows itself in the utter 
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impossibility of our living entirely unto ourselves, and in our 
necessary involvement with the life and inner feeling of even 
the most remote conscious being. It is, we may paradoxically 
say, because personal self-sufficiency and separateness are not 
and cannot be, because they are states approachable only because 
we can thereupon retreat from them, and utterly do away with 
them, that the various members of the realm of values have the 
firm status that they have, they they haunt us so persistently, and 
that they can at times overshadow the limited personal and so-
cial needs of our immediate being and environment. The sense 
of affirming an Absolute therefore lies, among other things, in 
the inexorability of the moral firmament, constructed as we 
have constructed it. The Absolute may not be a thing open to 
sensuous observation, but it remains like a grey eminence be-
hind our otherwise incompletely intelligible postulations of 
absolute values. The Absolute is, however, something that we 
encounter along many avenues, and the avenue of values and 
disvalues is not necessarily the most important and most beau-
tiful of its main vistas. It is, however, the only avenue that we 
have been concerned to explore this evening. 
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The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established 
in 1941 in memory of Ernest H. Lindley, Chancellor of the Univer-
sity of Kansas from 1920 to 1939. In February 1941 l'vfr. Roy Roberts, 
the chairman of the committee in charge, suggested in the Graduate 
M agazine that 
the Chancellor should invite to the University for a lecture or 
a series of lectures, some outstanding national or world figure 
to speak on " Values of Living"-just as the late Chancellor 
proposed lO do in his courses "The Human Situation" and 
"Plan for Living." 
In the following June Mr. Roberts circulated a letter on behalf of 
the Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that 
The income from this fund should be spent in a quest of 
social betterment by bringing to the University each year 
outstanding world l e:~ders for a lectu re or series of lectures, 
yet with a design so broad in its outline that in the years to 
come, if it is deemed wise, this living memorial could take 
some more desirable form. 
The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor 
Richard McKeon lectured on "Human Rights and International 
Relations." The next lecture was given in 1959 by Professor Everett 
C. Hughes, and has been published by the University of Kansas 
School of Law as pan of his book Studen ts' Cultu1·e and Perspec-
tives: Lectw·es on M edical and Genera./ Education . The selection 
of lecturers for the Lindley series has since been delegated to the 
Department of Philosophy. The following lectures have been pub-
lished, and may be obtained from the Department at a price of 
fifty cents each. 
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